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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1 
The Court below ruled that Plaintiff-Appellee Lowry, who is an owner of 
water rights in water running in a natural stream over Palmer's property, but who 
is not an owner of the watercourse, owes a duty under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8, 
"to Palmer and to others to maintain the watercourse to prevent wasting water or 
damaging the property of Palmer and others and to keep the culverts under the 
highways in good repair." 
Did the District Court err when it interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 as 
imposing on Lowry, who is an owner of a share of water but not an owner of the 
watercourse, a duty maintain the watercourse on Palmer's property? 
Standard of Review 
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 
1201,1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 
1999); Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
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Where Preserved in the District Court 
At trial, counsel for Palmer stated, 
[T]he purpose for which they claim any prescriptive easement 
doesn't exist. Mr. Lowry, when he gets on the stand, cannot tell you why 
he needs an easement going through my client's property. He can't tell 
you because there is absolutely no purpose. 
The - it is not an irrigation ditch as it referred to in their pleadings, 
it as a natural stream. It has been designated that since the early 2000's 
and - and Mr. Lowry knew that...Because...Mr. Lowry intended to take 
that and pipe that water... 
And so my client went to the State and found out that that in fact 
is a stream, it's a natural stream designated by the Division of Water 
Rights and, when a stream or a water flow like that is designated as 
such, no one - no one can touch that stream. Not even my client, even 
though it runs through their property. They can't do any changes to that 
stream or do any work on that stream without first applying for a permit 
for the state of Utah. 
(TR for Hearing of 06-03-2009, ROA p. 130, 10:12-11:12). 
Statute 
Utah Code Ann. 73-1-8. Duties of owners of ditches ~ Safe 
condition ~ Bridges. 
(1) The owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse 
shall: 
(a) maintain it to prevent waste of water or damage to the 
property of others; and 
(b) by bridge or otherwise, keep it in good repair where it 
crosses any public road or highway to prevent obstruction to travel or 
damage or overflow on the public road or highway. 
(2) The provisions of Subsection (l)(b) do not apply where a 
governmental entity maintains or elects to maintain a bridge or other 
device to prevent obstruction to travel or damage or overflow on the 
public road or highway. 
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(3) An owner or operator of a ditch, canal, stream, or river, is 
immune from suit if: 
(a) the damage or personal injury arises out of, is in connection 
with, or results from the use of a pedestrian or equestrian trail that is 
along a ditch, canal, stream, or river, regardless of ownership or 
operation of the ditch, canal, stream, or river; 
(b) the trail is designated under a general plan adopted by a 
municipality under Section 10-9a-401 or by a county under Section 
17-27a-401; 
(c) the trail right-of-way or the right-of-way where the trail is 
located is open to public use as evidenced by a written agreement 
between the owner or operator of the trail right-of-way, or of the 
right-of-way where the trail is located, and the municipality or county 
where the trail is located; and 
(d) the written agreement: 
(i) contains a plan for operation and maintenance of the trail; 
and 
(ii) provides that an owner or operator of the trail right-of-way, 
or of the right-of-way where the trail is located has, at minimum, the 
same level of immunity from suit as the governmental entity in 
connection with or resulting from use of the trail. 
Issue 2 
Did the District Court err when it interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 57-13a-
102 as applying to natural streams so as to grant Appellee an easement across 
Appellants' property? 
Plaintiff-Appellee Lowry claimed to have an easement across 
Defendant-Appellant Palmer's property in order to maintain a natural stream 
running across Palmer's property and on to Lowry's property. However, as will be 
discussed, Lowry had previously attempted to alter the stream but was prevented 
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by the State because the waterway is a natural stream and Lowry therefore could 
not alter it. 
Standard of Review 
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question 
of law reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 
1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 
1999); Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Where Preserved in the District Court 
The court below stated that, "[a]s a separate defense Palmer asserts that 
prescriptive easements cannot be established for use of a natural stream. ITie Road 
of course is not a natural stream. Moreover, § 57-13 a-102 Utah Code Ann. which 
provides for establishment of a prescriptive easement for the conveyance of water 
is not limited to artificially created waterways." (Memorandum Decision, ROA at 
118). 
Also, at trial, counsel for Palmer stated, 
[T]he purpose for which they claim any prescriptive easement 
doesn't exist. Mr. Lowry, when he gets on the stand, cannot tell you why 
he needs an easement going through my client's property. He can't tell 
you because there is absolutely no purpose. 
The - it is not an irrigation ditch as it referred to in their pleadings, 
it as a natural stream. It has been designated that since the early 2000's 
and - and Mr. Lowry knew that...Because...Mr. Lowry intended to take 
that and pipe that water... 
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And so my client went to the State and found out that that in fact 
is a stream, it's a natural stream designated by the Division of Water 
Rights and, when a stream or a water flow like that is designated as 
such, no one - no one can touch that stream. Not even my client, even 
though it runs through their property. They can't do any changes to that 
stream or do any work on that stream without first applying for a permit 
for the state of Utah. 
(TR for Hearing of 06-03-2009, ROA p. 130,10:12-11:12). 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. 57-13a-102. Prescriptive easement for water 
conveyance. 
(1) A prescriptive easement may be established if a water user has 
maintained a water conveyance for a period of 20 years during which the 
use has been: 
(a) continuous; 
(b) open and notorious; and 
(c) adverse. 
(2) If Subsections (l)(a) and (b) are established, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the use has been adverse. 
Utah Code Ann. 57-13a-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Water conveyance" means a canal, ditch, pipeline, or other 
means of conveying water. 
(2) "Water user" means a water user or the water user's predecessor 
whose water being conveyed is represented by a water right recognized 
under state law or by shares in a mutual irrigation company. 
Issue 3 
Did the District Court violate public policy when it granted Lowry an 
easement across Palmer's property even though the court found that the purpose of 
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Lowry's Complaint was nothing more than the continuation of a grudge match and 
"bitter feelings" between Lowry and Palmer? 
Standard of Review 
While the conclusion that a prescriptive easement exists is a question of 
law, it is so fact-dependent that trial courts are generally accorded a broad measure 
of discretion when applying the correct legal standard to the given set of facts and 
are only overturned if the trial court's decision was in excess of this broad 
discretion. Valcarce v.Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d305, 311 (Utah 1998). 
Where preserved below 
Palmer argued before the court below that "the purpose for which [Lowry] 
claim[s] any prescriptive easement doesn't exist. Mr. Lowry, when he gets on the 
stand, cannot tell you why he needs an easement going through my client's 
property. He can't tell you because there is absolutely no purpose." (TR. ROA p. 
130; 10:12-16). 
Issue 4 
Did the District Court err when it held that Lowry's self-serving testimony 
established that he had used the property sufficient to satisfy the requirements of a 
prescriptive easement? 
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Standard of Review 
When an appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a clearly 
erroneous standard of appellate review applies. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners 
Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 2008 UT App 105, f 10, 182 P.3d 417 (internal quotation 
marks omitted), cert, denied, 199 P.3d 970 (Utah 2008). 
Issue 5 
Did the District Court err as a matter of common law when it awarded a 
prescriptive easement over the road on the Palmer property. 
Standard of Review 
Questions of common law interpretation are questions of law which the 
appellate court is well suited to address, and thus gives no deference to the lower 
court. See Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992); State v. 
Richardson, 843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("[W]e consider the trial 
court's interpretation of binding case law as presenting a question of law and 
review the trial court's interpretation of that law for correctness."). A trial court's 
conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed for correctness. See S.S. v. State, 
972 P.2d 439, 440-41 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254,1256 (Utah 
1998); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, 
522 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal involves the establishment by Judgment and Decree of the court 
below of a prescriptive easement through the appellant Palmer's property. The 
District Court below correctly described this case as "a big pissing contest." TR. 
ROA p. 130, 222:13-14). It started when Lowry came onto Palmer's property and 
told Palmer that Lowry was going to be bringing in a backhoe in order to install a 
pipeline across Palmer's property. (Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, ROA at 111). Alarmed, Palmer notified the state 
Department of Natural Resources who in turn wrote Lowry a letter telling him he 
could not install such a pipeline without a stream alteration permit and that such a 
permit likely would not be issued. (Id.) 
Consequently, Lowry contacted the Department of Natural Resources and 
alleged that Palmer had engaged in stream alteration activities to the stream on 
Palmer's property. (Id.) In support of this allegation, Lowry had driven onto 
Palmer's property to take pictures of the alleged alteration whereupon the Palmer 
family, who were engaged in a family function on the property, began taking 
pictures of Lowry on their property. (Id. at 112) Seeing the Palmers taking his 
picture, Lowry leapt into his car and sped past them exiting the Palmer property. 
(Id.) Palmer reported Lowry's reckless exit from his property to law enforcement 
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and Lowry was subsequently charged with reckless driving to which he pled no 
contest in a plea in abeyance agreement. (Id.) According the District Court's 
findings, the "bitter feelings that arose between Mr. Lowry and Mr. Palmer arising 
out of these events is the impetus and primary motivation" for the complaint filed 
in this case asking the court to decree the existence of an easement in Lowry's 
favor across Palmer's property. 
Lowry is the owner of approximately 186.9 acres of real property located 
approximately 3/4 mile south of Manti and west of old highway 89 in Sanpete 
County, State of Utah. Palmer is the owner of approximately 16.37 acres of real 
property located approximately 3/4 mile south of Manti in Sanpete County, State 
of Utah, which lies east of old highway 89 and west of new highway 89. (ROA p. 
109-110). 
The State of Utah Division of Wildlife Resources owns a parcel of 
property on the east side of new Highway 89. (Id. at 110). Located on the State's 
property is a free flowing natural spring known as Crystal Springs. (Id.) The water 
from Crystal Springs forms a stream that flows west through the State's property, 
then under new highway 89, then through the Palmer property and then under old 
highway 89 to the Lowry property. (Id). 
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Lowry owns the water rights and the right to use approximately 
six-sevenths of the Crystal Springs water on the Lowry property. (Id.) Palmer 
owns the water rights and the right to use approximately one-seventh of the 
Crystal Springs water on the Palmer property. (Id.) 
There is an unpaved road that somewhat parallels the Crystal Springs 
stream that passes through the Palmer property from old highway 89 to new 
highway 89. (Id. at 111). The road passes by the Palmer residence and past the 
Palmer's equipment business. The road is the access to both the Palmer residence 
and the Palmer business. (Id.) 
Palmer has owned the property in question since 1989. (Id. at 110). Palmer 
testified to having seen Lowry come onto Palmer's property eight times in the 
twenty years that Palmer has owned the property. (TR ROA 133, p. 132). 
In its complaint Lowry sought a judicial determination declaring that it 
owns a prescriptive easement in the Crystal Springs stream for the conveyance of 
water to the Lowry property and that it owns a prescriptive easement on the Road 
for access to the Lowry property as well as for monitoring and maintaining the 
Crystal Springs stream. Lowry also sought a declaration that the Road has been 
dedicated to the public as a public thoroughfare and is thus a"public road." The 
court granted Lowry a prescriptive easement regarding the stream pursuant to Utah 
10 
Code Ann. § 57-13a-102 and granted Lowry an prescriptive easement over the 
road on the Palmer property. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point One 
The District Court erroneously concluded that Lowry owes a duty under 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 to come onto Palmer's property and maintain the stream. 
The court below applied this section to the present case to justify an easement in 
favor of Lowry by erroneously imposing upon Lowry a duty "to Palmer and to 
others to maintain the watercourse [i.e., the natural stream running through 
Palmer's property] to prevent wasting water or damaging the property of Palmer 
and others and to keep the culverts under the highways in good repair." 
(Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; ROA at 
115). However, Lowry is not the owner of the stream running through Palmer's 
property. 
Point Two 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-13 a-102 does not apply to natural streams and the 
District Court therefore erred when it interpreted the statute so as to grant Lowry 
an easement across the Palmers' property. 
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Point Three 
An easement in favor of Lowry across Palmer's property violates public policy 
where the court found that the purpose of Lowry's Complaint was nothing more 
than the continuation of a grudge match and "bitter feelings" between Lowry and 
Palmer 
Point Four 
The court below erred when it held that Lowry's self-serving testimony 
established that he had used the property sufficiently to satisfy the requirements 
of a prescriptive easement. Lowry's testimony regarding his use of the road is 
conclusory, vague and sweeping. The testimony of Palmer and Williams refutes 
Lowry's testimony and the court was in error to hold that it outweighed the 
specific contrary testimony of Palmer and Williams. 
Point Five 
The District Court err as a matter of common law when it awarded a 
prescriptive easement over the road on the Palmer property when there was no 




The District Court erroneously concluded that Lowry owes a duty under 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 to come onto Palmer's property and maintain the 
stream 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 states in relevant part: 
(1) The owner of any ditch, canal, flume or other watercourse shall: 
(a) maintain it to prevent waste of water or damage to the property of 
others; and 
(b) by bridge or otherwise, keep it in good repair where it crosses any 
public road or highway to prevent obstruction to travel or damage or 
overflow on the public road or highway. 
The court below applied this section to the present case to justify an 
easement in favor of Lowry by erroneously imposing upon Lowry a duty "to 
Palmer and to others to maintain the watercourse [i.e., the natural stream running 
through Palmer's property] to prevent wasting water or damaging the property of 
Palmer and others and to keep the culverts under the highways in good repair." 
(Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; ROA at 
115). 
However, Lowry is not the owner of the stream running through Palmer's 
property. Furthermore, it was never argued in the court below that Lowry owned 
the stream on Palmer's property. Nor was there any evidence presented to 
establish Lowry as an owner of the stream. Lowry never even attempted to 
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establish in the court below any ownership rights to the watercourse. Rather, it 
was established and uncontested that Lowry "owns the water rights and the right 
to use approximately six-sevenths of the [water from the stream] on the Lowry 
property." (Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
ROA at 110). However, ownership of water rights in water flowing through a 
watercourse does not constitute ownership of the watercourse. 
Palmer, not Lowry, is the owner of the watercourse running through the 
Palmer property. Furthermore, Palmer owns the water rights and the right to use 
approximately one-seventh of the water running through his property via the 
stream. (Id. at 110-11). Under the statute, if anyone, it is Palmer, not Lowry who 
has a duty to maintain the water course. Lowry's similar duty starts, not on 
Palmer's property, but after the stream leaves Palmer's property and enters 
Lowry's property. 
Because Lowry does not own the watercourse (i.e. the natrual stream 
running through Palmer's property), the court was in error when it concluded that 
Lowry owes a duty under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 to come onto Palmer's 
property and maintain the stream. 
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POINT n 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-13a-102 does not apply to natural streams and the 
District Court therefore erred when it interpreted the statute so as to grant 
Lowry an easement across the Palmers' property 
In the case below, Lowry, an owner of a share of water rights, sought to 
modify the natural stream running through Palmer's property. (Memorandum 
Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, FOF fflf 9,12, ROA at 
110,11 l-12)(stating, "Fred Lowry allegedly informed Guy Palmer of Fred 
Lowry's intention to bring a backhoe onto the Palmer property to install a pipeline 
to pipe the Crystal Springs water through the Palmer property....Thereafter, Mr. 
Palmer reported Mr. Lowry's intentions to the State of Utah Department of 
Natural Resources Division of Water Rights who informed Mr. Lowry by letter 
dated May 1,1998 that because the Crystal Springs stream is a natural stream 
Lowry would need a stream alteration permit for such a pipeline; which permit 
likely would not be issued.")(emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-29 (1) addresses alterations of natural streams 
and states in relevant part that, "a... person may not relocate any natural stream 
channel or alter the beds and banks of any natural stream without first obtaining 
the written approval of the state engineer." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3.5 (2) 
addresses alterations by a holder of a water share and states that a holder of a 
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proportionate share of water "who seeks to change the point of diversion, place of 
use, or purpose of use of the shareholder's proportionate share of water in the 
water company shall submit a request for the change, in writing, to the water 
company." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-29 governs access to private lands when "any 
applicant for the use of water from any stream or water source must necessarily 
enter upon private property in order to make a survey to secure the required 
information for making a water filing and is refused" entry upon the private 
property: The applicant in such a case "may petition the district court for an order 
granting such right, and after notice and hearing, such court may grant such 
permission, on security being given to pay all damage caused thereby to the owner 
of such property." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-29. 
In the present case, Lowry sued for an easement across Palmer's property 
after Palmer denied Lowry permission to bring a backhoe onto Palmer's property 
in order to install a pipeline to pipe the Crystal Springs water through Palmer's 
property. (Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
FOFf 12;ROAp. 111). 
In its Conclusions of Law, the court below stated that: 
As owner of the Lowry property and owner of 
approximately six-sevenths of the water rights of Crystal 
Springs Lowry owns a prescriptive easement for the 
conveyance of Crustal Springs water thorough the Palmer 
16 
property at the location of the Crystal Springs stream 
pursuant to the provisions of § 57-13a-102. 
Id. Conclusions of Law ^ f 1; ROA p. 115. 
However, this Conclusion was erroneous. Utah Code Ann. § 57-13a-102 
states: 
(1) A prescriptive easement may be established if a water user 
has maintained a water conveyance for a period of 20 years during 
which the use has been: 
(a) continuous; 
(b) open and notorious; and 
(c) adverse. 
(2) If Subsections (l)(a) and (b) are established, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the use has been adverse. 
"Water conveyance" means a canal, ditch, pipeline, or other means of 
conveying water. Utah Code Ann. §57-13a-101(1). 
The District Court's application of § 57-13a-102 to the facts of the 
present case was erroneous in two ways. 
First, Crystal Springs is not a "water conveyance." It is a natural stream. In 
defining water conveyance, the statute provides man-made examples amenable to 
being "maintained" such as canals, ditches, and pipelines. True, the statute 
provides that the definition encompasses "other means of conveying water." 
However, the doctrine of ejusdem generis restricts the definition of a general 
phrase at the end of a statutory list of more specific terms to the "same kind, class, 
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character, or nature as those specifically enumerated, unless there is something to 
show a contrary intent." In reA.T., 2001 UT 82, \ 12, 34 P.3d 228; accord State v. 
Piep, 2004 UT App 7,110, 84 P.3d 850. As mentioned, the statutory list of 
specific examples of "water conveyance" is made up of man-made conveyances. 
Moreover, the conveyances listed in the statute are amenable to being 
"maintained." Under Title 73, Chapter 3 discussed above, streams are not 
amenable to "maintenance" in the same sense man-made water conveyances are. 
First, applications must be submitted and permissions granted in order to 
"maintain" a natural stream, even where "an emergency situation arises which 
involves immediate or actual flooding and threatens injury or damage to persons 
or property." See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-29(1 )(b). Unlike man-made 
conveyances, there is no statutory right to "maintain" a natural stream. 
The second way in which the District Court's application of § 57-13a-102 
to the facts of the present case was erroneous is that here there was no evidence 
that Lowry ever "maintained" the stream. To do so, Lowry would have had to get a 
permit and, had Palmer nevertheless denied Lowry access to the Palmer property, 
Lowry would have had recourse to apply to the court for an order granting access. 
As a matter of law, there is simply nothing to maintain on the Palmer property. 
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The Court asserts that Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-8 "imposes maintenance 
duties on owners of any watercourse," natural or man-made. However, Lowry 
does not own the watercourse. Rather, he owns simply a share of the water rights. 
Moreover, Palmer also owns rights in the water. The duties of maintenance of that 
portion of the stream running through Palmer's property fall properly on Palmer. 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court was in error when it applied 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-13 a-102 to the facts of the present case and granted Lowry 
an easement across Palmer's property. 
POINT in 
An easement in favor of Lowry across Palmer's property violates public 
policy 
In Alvey Development Corp v. Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 220, 51 P.3d 
45 (Ut.App.2002) this court articulated the following public policy with regard to 
prescriptive easements: 
[I]n Utah there is an important interest for property owners to possess 
unencumbered titles...because public policy favors certainty in title to 
real property, to protect bona fide purchasers and to avoid conflicts of 
ownership, which may engender needless litigation. 
Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 220, \ 16 (citation, brackets, omitted).1 
1lAlvey Development Corp v. Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 220, 51 P.3d 45 
(Ut.App.2002) articulated this policy in the context of the denial of the revival of a 
prescriptive easement after it had been extinguished. 
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The District Court below correctly described this case as "a big pissing 
contest." TR. ROA p. 130, 222:13-14). It started when Lowry came onto Palmer's 
property and told Palmer that Lowry was going to be bringing in a backhoe in 
order to install a pipeline across Palmer's property. (Memorandum Decision and 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, ROA at 111). Alarmed, Palmer notified 
the state Department of Natural Resources who in turn wrote Lowry a letter telling 
him he could not install such a pipeline without a stream alteration permit and that 
such a permit likely would not be issued. (Id.) 
Consequently, Lowry contacted the Department of Natural Resources and 
alleged that Palmer had engaged in stream alteration activities to the stream on 
Palmer's property. (Id.) In support of this allegation, Lowry had driven onto 
Palmer's property to take pictures of the alleged alteration whereupon the Palmer 
family, who were engaged in a family function on the property, began taking 
pictures of Lowry on their property. (Id. at 112) Seeing the Palmers taking his 
picture, Lowry leapt into his car and sped past them exiting the Palmer property. 
(Id.) Palmer reported Lowry's reckless exit from his property to law enforcement 
and Lowry was subsequently charged with reckless driving to which he pled no 
contest in a plea in abeyance agreement. (Id.) According the District Court's 
findings, the "bitter feelings that arose between Mr. Lowry and Mr. Palmer arising 
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out of these events is the impetus and primary motivation" for the complaint filed 
in this case asking the court to decree the existence of an easement in Lowry's 
favor across Palmer's property. 
As discussed in Points I and II above, and as Palmer argued in the court 
below, (TR. ROA p.130, 10:12-16), there is no legitimate purpose or reason for 
Lowry to come onto Palmer's property. As the owner of the watercourse, it is 
Palmer's duty to maintain it. Further, as discussed above, if Lowry desires to make 
alterations, he would have to obtain a permit from the state and would then have 
statutory recourse if Palmer refused him admittance onto the property. 
Lowry should not be allowed to use the courts to further his own agenda in 
a grudge match against one of his neighbors. The Utah courts recognize a public 
policy of unencumbered title and this case illustrates one reason for such policy: 
"to protect bona fide purchasers and to avoid conflicts of ownership, which may 
engender needless litigation." Mackelprang, 2002 UT App 220, f 16. 
POINT IV 
The court below erred when it held that Lowry's self-serving 
testimony established that he had used the property sufficient to satisfy the 
requirements of a prescriptive easement 
Marshalling of the evidence 
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Lowry's testimony concerning his use of the Road across the Palmer 
property consists of the following: 
Lowry claims to have ridden his pony across the road on a regular basis 
when he was five years old in 1945 (TR. ROA 130, p. 21:21-25). Lowry claims to 
have driven a tractor across the property numerous times during the 1950s. (Id. p. 
22:3-7). Lowry claims to have driven through the property on a regular basis in 
the 1960s. (Id. p. 22:12-19). As to the 1970s and 1980s, Lowry was asked on 
direct examination, "Go up the next decade, in the - well, let me go clear forward, 
'70s and '80s, did you ever use that driveway?" (Id. 22:20-22). Lowry answered 
simply, "Absolutely. In the same way that I just described." (Id. 22:23-25). Lowry 
testified that in the 1990s he crossed the property "probably between [once] a 
month and a quarter, depending on how often we felt it necessary to check the 
water." (Id. p. 42:1-2). 
Lowry did not testify to using the road in the 2000s. 
Meanwhile, Guy Palmer, who has owned the property since 1989 testified 
that in the 20 years he owned the property he has seen Lowry on the property 
about eight times. (Id. 132:5-8). Eugene S. Williams testified that he lived on the 
property with his parents starting in 1967 through 1989 and that the road was not 
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used as a thoroughfare and that he never saw Lowry on the property. (Id. p. 109-114). 
Lowry's testimony regarding his use of the road is conclusory, vague and 
sweeping. The testimony of Palmer and Williams refutes Lowry's testimony and 
the court was in error to hold that it outweighed the specific contrary testimony of 
Palmer and Williams. 
POINT V 
The District Court erred as a matter of common law when it awarded a 
prescriptive easement over the road on the Palmer property when there was 
no testimony that Lowry used the road at any time during the 2000s. 
An easement by prescription arises under common law from a use of the 
servient estate that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of 20 
years. Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984) citing Jensen v.Brown, 
639 P.2d 150,152 (Utah 1981). 
Palmer has owned the property in question since 1989. (Memorandum 
Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, FOF 17). Palmer testified 
to having seen Lowry come onto Palmer's property eight times in the twenty years 
that Palmer has owned the property, usually to come to the Palmer home or to 
otherwise converse with Palmer. TR June 3,2009, p. 132). 
The District Court ruled that "a prescriptive easement over the Road was 
established by the use of Lowry and his predecessors in interest no later than 
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1965." The Court found that Lowry testified to using the road through the 1960, 
1970s and 1980s and 1990s. (FOF115). However, the Court made no findings 
regarding Lowry's use of the road after Palmer bought the property in 1989. 
The Trial Court erroneously stated that such findings established that a 
prescriptive easement was established by the use of Lowry and his predecessors in 
interest no later than 1965. (Id. at f 7). A prescriptive easement requires use that 
is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of 20 years. In the present 
case, there is no showing that the use was continuous for twenty years up to the 
present time. Instead, the Court decreed that a prescriptive easement was 
established "no later than 1965." But here the Court has erroneously granted a 
prescriptive easement retrospectively. That is, the Court found that the elements of 
a prescriptive easement once existed and that when the 20 year period had run, an 
easement sprang automatically into existence "no later than 1965." However, it is 
not alleged that an easement was ever established at that time or even that anyone 
ever sought an easement before the present time. 
An easement cannot be said to exist where the elements of a prescriptive 
easement once existed but no longer do. Otherwise, there would be no end to 
claims of easements where it could be shown that, perhaps fifty or a hundred years 
ago, a plaintiffs predecessor in interest had openly, notoriously, adversely, and 
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continuously crossed a defendant's property for a period of 20 years, although no 
one had so crossed in recent years or decades. That is precisely what the Court 
below has done in this case. The Court ruled that, despite a lack of showing that an 
there has been use of the servient property since 1989, because Lowry and his 
predecessors in interest can be said at some time in the past to have technically 
satisfied the requirements of a prescriptive easement, then such an easement exists 
as of that time, despite no one ever having come forward to assert a claim of such 
an easement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court's ruling for Lowry granting him 
easement over and on Palmer's property should be reversed, and attorney fees 
should be reversed. Appellants ask for an award of attorneys fees incurred on 
appeal. 
DATED this (Z~ day of May, 2010 
Douglas L. Neeley (#6290) 
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